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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10(i) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented by this petition and the applicable 
standard of appellate review are as follows: 
(1) Whether or not the Board of Review erred in 
affirming the Administrative Law Judge's decision that the 
Petitioner, Norman Miller dba Norm Miller Used Cars 
(hereinafter referred to as "Miller"), did not have good 
cause to file a late appeal. Standard of Review: Whether 
Board of Review's decision is supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
Court and is reasonable. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (4) (1953, 
as amended); Armstrong v. Dep't of Employment Security, 834 
P.2d 562 (Utah App. 1992). 
(2) Whether or not the Board of Review erred in 
affirming the Administrative Law Judge's decision that Mr. 
Miller did not have good cause to request rescheduling of the 
March 9, 1992 hearing. Standard of Review: Whether Board of 
Review's decision is supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the Court and is 
1 
reasonable. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4) (1953, as amended); 
Armstrong v. Dep't of Employment Security. 834 P.2d 562 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Constitutional Provisions: 
None. 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10(a),(b),(d),(e),(h), and (i). 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4) 
Ordinances: 
None. 
Rules: 
UAC R562-6C-7 
UAC R562-6C-8 
UAC R562-6c-10.1.a 
UAC R562-6c-10.2.a 
UAC R562-6C-11.4 
UAC R562-10b-l 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case before the Court results from an Audit 
Determination dated October 23, 199j6 in which the respondent, 
Department of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, assessed the petitioner, Norman Miller dba Norm Miller Used 
Cars, contributions, interest, and penalties in the sum of 
$6,054.90 for unreported wages during the years 1988 through 1990. 
Mr. Miller did not file a written appeal until December 
11, 1992. A hearing was set for March 9, 1992 which Mr. Miller 
failed to attend. On March 27, 1992 Mr. Miller mailed a written 
request to reschedule the hearing. On May 13, 1992 a hearing was 
held before the administrative law judge, Kenneth A. Major, on 
whether or not good cause existed for Mr. Miller's late appeal and 
for his failure to appear at the March 9, 1992 hearing. The 
Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Miller did not have 
good cause to reschedule a hearing, and, in the alternative, did 
not file a timely appeal and did not have good cause for late 
filing. 
Mr. Miller then appealed to the Board of Review who 
affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and the case 
is now before the Court on a Petition for Review. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts are material to a consideration of 
the questions presented: 
(1) On or about October 23, 1991, the Department of 
Employment Security mailed a Notice of Audit Determination, 
together with Schedules of Unreported Wages for the years 
1988 through 1990, to Mr. Miller at P.O. Box 392, Lehi, Utah 
84043-0392. Decision of Administrative Law Judge as set 
forth in Record for Petition for Review and as adopted by 
Board of Review (hereincifter referred to as "ALJ/Record on 
Appeal"), p. 37. 
(2) The Notice of Audit Determination assessed 
contributions, interest, and penalties in the sum of 
$6,054.90, and notified Mr. Miller that the decision became 
final within ten (10) days unless Mr. Miller filed a written 
appeal. ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 37; Record on Appeal 7-8. 
(3) On November 1, 1991 Mr. Miller called the field 
auditor, James Alexander (hereinafter referred to as the 
"auditor"), and notified him that he had just received the 
Notice of Audit Determination from his accountant. 
ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 37. 
(4) The auditor explained to Mr. Miller that he would 
be required to file a written appeal specifying the reasons 
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for the appeal. The auditor also granted Mr. Miller an 
extension to file the appeal, the time of which is not 
supported by substantial evidence. Hearing Transcript, p. 
5-8; Record on Appeal, 30-33; Record on Appeal, p. 9 (Exhibit 
6a) . 
(5) Mr. Miller called the auditor again at which time 
the auditor reiterated the procedure to file a written 
appeal; however, when such calls occurred was not determined. 
Hearing Transcript, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 33. 
(6) Mr. Miller mailed a letter of appeal on December 
11, 1991 setting forth the reasons for his appeal. 
ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 37. 
(7) The Department of Employment Security sent notice 
to Mr. Miller notifying him that a hearing was set for the 
matter on March 9, 1992 at the Provo Job Service Office; 
however, when notice was sent was not established in the 
proceedings. Record on Appeal, p. 19 (Exhibit A-l). 
(8) The notice of hearing included instructions which 
notified Mr. Miller that if he failed to attend the hearing, 
a decision on the matter would nevertheless be issued and 
that he would have seven days within which to request that 
the hearing be rescheduled. ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 36. 
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(9) Mr. Miller erroneously recorded hearing date on his 
calendar for March 19, 1992 rather than March 9, 1992. 
ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 36. 
(10) Mr. Miller failed to appear at the March 9, 1992 
hearing, and immediately upon discovering the error a few 
days later, Mr. Miller telephoned the Administrative Law 
Judge to request another hearing to which the Administrative 
Law Judge notified Mr. Miller that he must make such request 
in writing and explain why he failed to appear. ALJ/Record 
on Appeal, p. 36. 
(11) The Administrative Law Judge did not notify Mr. 
Miller of the necessity to file the request within 7 days of 
the hearing and shortly after speaking with the 
Administrative Law Judge concerning the hearing, Mr. Miller 
received a decision pursuant to the March 9, 1992 hearing 
which stated he had 30 days to file an appeal. Mr. Miller 
believed that was the controlling time limit. Record on 
Appeal, p. 21 (Exhibit B) . Hearing Transcript, pp. 3-4; 
Record on Appeal, pp. 28-29. 
(12) Pursuant to the Administrative Law Judge's 
directions, Mr. Miller sent the written request for 
rescheduling to the Administrative Law Judge on March 27, 
1992. ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 36. 
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(13) On May 13, 1992 a hearing was held at the Provo 
Job Service office before the Administrative Law Judge. 
ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 36. 
(14) In a decision rendered on or about May 22, 1992, 
the Administrative Law Judge held that Mr. Miller did not 
have good cause to request rescheduling, or, in the 
alternative, that the Appeals Tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction over the matter under Utah Code Ann. §35-4-
10(b) (1953, as amended) as a result of Mr. Miller's failure 
to file a timely appeal and the fact that he did not have 
good cause to file a timely appeal. ALJ/Record on Appeal, 
p. 36-37. 
(15) On June 22, 1992 the Board of Review acknowledged 
receipt of Mr. Miller's appeal on the issues of whether or 
not he had good cause for the late appeal to the 
Administrative Law Judge and whether Mr. Miller had good 
cause for failing to attend the March 9, 1992 hearing. 
Record on Appeal, p. 46. 
(16) On September 1, 1992 the Board of Review mailed its 
decision to Mr. Miller affirming the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge. Record on Appeal, p. 48. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I.: The Board of Review's affirmance of the ALJ's 
decision that Mr. Miller did not have good cause to file a late 
appeal is not reasonable since the Board's findings regarding the 
alleged 10-day extension time are not supported by substantial 
evidence given the contradictory nature of the note signed by the 
field auditor regarding the cippeal, the failure of the Board to 
identify the dates on which Mr. Miller spoke with the auditor 
subsequent to November 11, 1991, and given Mr. Miller's testimony 
that he mailed the written appeal as soon as he was notified by 
the auditor that he needed to do so. In addition, the ALJ failed 
to elicit all relevant facts at the hearing. 
Moreover, the Board's affirmance is also not reasonable 
nor supported by substantial evidence in light of the misleading 
statements of the field auditor in regard to the nature of the 
appeal and the amount of information Mr. Miller needed to gather 
in support of his appeal. 
Point II,: The Board of Review's decision affirming the 
ALJ's decision that good cause did not exist to request 
rescheduling is not supported by substantial evidence and is 
clearly unreasonable in light of (1) the lack of any 
substantiating evidence indicating that notice of the March 9, 
1992 hearing was mailed to Mr. Miller at least 7 days prior to the 
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hearing as required by R562-6c-10.1.a, (2) the ALJ's failure to 
warn Mr, Miller regarding his time constraints, and (3) Mr. 
Miller's subsequent receipt of the March 11, 1992 decision 
notifying him that he had 30 days within which to appeal the March 
9, 1992 decision which resulted in confusion as to the time limit 
within which Mr. Miller had to reschedule the hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE'S DECISION THAT MR. MILLER DID NOT HAVE GOOD CAUSE TO 
FILE A LATE APPEAL. 
A. Section 35-4-10 of the Utah Code and the Rules 
promulgated by the Industrial Commission govern Mr. 
Miller's appeal. 
Pursuant to Section 35-4-10, Utah Code Ann, (1953, as 
amended) , the review of a decision or determination in cases 
involving contribution liability, as in the case of Mr. Miller, 
shall first be made by the Industrial Commission (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Commission") or its authorized representative. 
After a decision is reached notice thereof is to be given to the 
employer. The decision made pursuant to the review is the final 
decision of the Commission unless, within ten (10) days after the 
date of notification or mailing, the employer files a notice of 
appeal to an administrative law judge (hereinafter referred to as 
the "ALJ"). Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10 (a); (b) (1953, as amended). 
-9 
After affording the parties with reasonable opportunity 
for a fair hearing, the ALJ is required to make findings and 
conclusions, and on that basis, affirm, modify, or reverse the 
determination. Notice and a copy of the decision and findings is 
to be promptly provided the parties. The decision is the final 
decision of the Commission unless, within ten (10) days after the 
date of mailing the notice to the parties1 last known addresses, 
the employer files an application for appeal to the Board of 
Review. Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10 (b) ; (d) (1953, as amended). 
Upon reviewing the evidence previously submitted and any 
additional evidence it requires, the Board of Review may affirm, 
modify, or reverse the decision of the ALJ. The Board of Review 
is then required to promptly notify the parties of its decision, 
together with its findings and conclusions. The decision of the 
Board of Review is final unless, within ten (10) days after 
mailing notice to the parties' last known address, the employer 
files a Petition for Review. Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10 (d) ; (h) 
(1953, as amended). 
In addition to the foregoing statutory provisions, 
appeals regarding determinations involving contribution liability 
are subject to the rules prescribed by the Commission for 
determining the rights of the parties. Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10 
(e) (1953, as amended). Pursuant to R562-10b-l of the Utah 
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Administrative Code (UAC), R562-6C shall apply to appeals of 
contribution decisions as well as appeals of benefit decisions. 
R562-6C-7 provides an appellant the opportunity to contest a 
finding that his appeal was not filed within the time allowed as 
follows: 
When it appears that an appeal may not have been 
filed within the time allowed by the Act or these Rules, 
the appellant will be notified and given an opportunity 
to show that the appeal was timely or was delayed for 
good cause. . . • 
Pursuant to R562-6c-8, "[a] late appeal may be considered on its 
merits if it is determined that the appeal was delayed for good 
cause." The rule further provides that good cause is limited to 
the following circumstances: 
1. The appeal was filed within 10 days of actual 
receipt of the decision if such receipt was beyond the 
original appeal period and not the result of willful neglect; 
or 
2. The delay in filing the appeal was due to 
circumstances beyond the control of the appellant; or 
3. The appellant delayed filing the appeal for 
circumstances which were compelling and reasonable. 
In the case before the Court, the Department of 
Employment Security (hereinafter referred to as the "Department") 
issued a Notice of Audit Determination dated October 23, 1991, 
together with Schedules of Unreported Wages for the years 1988 
through 1990. Record of Petition for Review to the Utah Court of 
Appeals from the Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of 
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Employment Security (hereinafter referred to as "Record on 
Appeal"), pp. 1-10, 32. The Notice stated that Mr. Miller's 
business failed to report all employment of the company resulting 
in an assessment to Mr. Miller of contributions, interest, and 
penalties ($6,054.90). Record on Appeal, p. 7. Consistent with 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10(a) (1953, as amended), 
the Notice informed Mr. Miller that the decision would become 
final unless, within 10 days from the date of mailing, Mr. Miller 
filed a written appeal setting forth the grounds upon which the 
appeal is made. Record on Appeal, p. 8. On November 1, 1991 the 
auditor received a telephone call from Mr. Miller who notified the 
auditor that he just received the Notice of Audit Determination 
from Mr. Miller's accountant. Reporter's Transcript of May 13, 
1992 Hearing (hereinafter referred to as "Hearing Transcript"), 
p. 7; Record on Appeal, p. 32. 
B. The Board of Review's findings that Mr. Miller was 
granted only a 10-day extension within which he could 
file an appeal is not supported by substantial evidence. 
Pursuant to the findings of the Administrative Law Judge 
("ALJ") dated May 22, 1992, which findings were adopted by the 
Board of Review in Case No. 92-BR-237-T, the auditor gave Mr. 
Miller an extension of only ten (10) additional days from the date 
of the call within which Mr. Miller could file a written appeal. 
These findings, however, are not supported by substantial 
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evidence, and therefore, appropriate relief should be granted to 
Mr. Miller. 
Pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
relief shall be granted if "the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4) 
(1953, as amended) . See also Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 
134, 137 (Utah App. 1992) . Pursuant to the decision of this Court 
in Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, " [substantial evidence 
is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.1" 776 P.2d 63, 68 (quoting 
Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Hunicutt, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (Idaho 
1985)). 
In challenging the findings of fact, Mr. Miller must 
marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that 
despite the supporting facts, the ALJ's findings are not supported 
by substantial evidence. First National Bank v. County Board of 
Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). The evidence supporting 
the ALJ's findings regarding an extension of time came exclusively 
from the testimony of the Department's field auditor, James 
Alexander, taken at the hearing conducted by the ALJ on May 13, 
1992 at the Provo Job Service Center. The testimony of the 
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auditor supporting the ALJ's findings in regard to the extension 
period was as follows: 
AUDITOR: . . . [Mr. Miller] had called me on November 1st 
to indicate that he had just obtained the 
Determination letters and that he had some time 
constraints. I informed him that it was the 
requirement of, as stated in the letter and of the 
Department that a written appeal needed to be filed 
and that such written appeal needed to be sent to 
this Department. Because of his statement that the 
had not received the Notice until just that date, 
having gone to his accountant's office and picked 
up the, the materials that were there at his 
accountant's office, he had indicated to me at that 
point that he had not received his, the employer's 
copy. I gave him at that point in time 10 days 
from that November 1st date in which to file a 
written appeal verbally over the telephone. 
ALJ: So you extended the appeal period by 10 days? 
AUDITOR: Yes, sir. 
ALJ: And would that have been extended to what date 
then? 
AUDITOR: That would have then been extended to the 11th of 
November. 
ALJ: And did you receive an appeal from him within that 
time frame? 
AUDITOR: No, sir, I did not. 
ALJ: And did you have communication with Mr. Miller 
after November 11th? 
AUDITOR: He did call me on two occasions, the dates I do not 
have available at this time, but he did call me on 
two occasions wh-, and both cases I told him that 
he needed to file a written appeal immediately and 
that timeliness had become an issue in terms of 
filing the appeal. 
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ALJ: 
AUDITOR: 
ALJ: 
AUDITOR: 
ALJ: 
You indicated you told him that the timeliness had 
become an issue also? 
Yes, sir, I did. 
And when did you actually receive an appeal from 
Miller? 
The postmark that we dated on the 11th of December, 
we received it, that was after the Field Audit 
Distribution Desk had already sent the audit to be 
processed. 
Okay, anything further you'd like to state con-
cerning the timeliness of the appellant's appeal? 
AUDITOR: None, sir. 
Hearing Transcript, pp. 7-8; Record on Appeal, pp. 32-33. No 
other evidence appears on the record in support of the ALJ's 
findings in this regard. 
Mr. Miller's testimony at the May 13th hearing, on the 
other hand, does not support the findings that only a ten-day 
extension was granted. Mr. Miller's testimony proceeded as 
follows: 
ALJ: . . . Would you explain why you waited beyond 10 
days in which to file your appeal? 
MILLER: Well, I, yea, I think it was Mr. Alexander I talked 
to, I called him up there two or three times in 
regards to this and then he told me later that I 
had to file in a written appeal and so when he told 
me that, that when I filed the written appeal. 
ALJ: And when did you first have conversation with him? 
15 
MILLER: 
ALJ: 
MILLER: 
ALJ: 
MILLER: 
* * * 
ALJ: 
I donft have an exact record of it but it was 
within a few days after I got this [Notice of Audit 
Determination]. 
And he told, did he tell you at that time to file 
a written appeal? 
No. 
Okay, when did he first tell you to file a written 
appeal? 
Well, I don't know but I filed it after we'd had 
the conversation, I wrote this request the next day 
after I, or somewhere near that, it was right 
shortly after that that I wrote the request in, on 
the, on the appeal. 
Is there a reason why you waited until December 
11th to file the appeal? 
MILLER: Well, like I said, I'd been in contact with Mr. 
Alexander two or three times in regards to it and 
he's the one that instructed me to, to send him a 
written request for a, an appeal. 
Hearing Transcript, pp. 5-6; Record on Appeal, pp. 3 0-31. As the 
testimony of Mr. Miller evidences, Mr. Miller was indeed given an 
extension of time within which to file an appeal. However, 
pursuant to Mr. Miller's testimony, a specific time frame was not 
given. 
If the testimony of Mr. Miller and the auditor 
constituted the only evidence* in regard to the appeal, it is clear 
the Court could not substitute its judgment for that of the Board 
of Review since deference will be afforded the Board of Review 
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where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence. 
However, although the testimony of Mr. Miller is not sufficient 
in itself to upset the findings of the Board of Review, when taken 
in light of the "whole record before the court/' it is clear that 
the ALJ's findings that Mr. Miller was only granted a 10-day 
extension are not supported by substantial evidence. 
Exhibit 6a is a copy of the letter Mr. Miller mailed to 
the auditor "appealing" the Audit Determination. The copy of the 
letter reflects, however, a note attached thereto and signed by 
the field auditor, James Alexander, which indicated the following: 
"Norm Miller Used Cars - Hold til 11-ie- 22 - Sending a letter." 
The information contained on this note clearly contradicts the 
testimony of the auditor and the findings of the Board regarding 
an extension of only 10 days. In light of the note by the field 
auditor, therefore, a reasonable mind could not accept the 
testimony of the auditor as adequate evidence to support the 
findings of the Board of Review regarding an extension of only ten 
days. See Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 
(Utah App. 1989). Indeed, the note more readily corroborates 
Mr. Miller's testimony that he called the auditor on several 
occasions and kept him informed as to his progress in the appeal. 
Moreover, although the ALJ examined the auditor quite 
thoroughly as to whether or not an extension had been granted and 
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as to the time period of that extensionf he did not examine Mr. 
Miller with respect to that issue other than to inquire as to why 
he had failed to file within the 10-day time limit. It is well 
established under Utah law, that "where one party in an 
administrative hearing is not represented by counsel, this court 
has acknowledged that the officer conducting the hearing has 'an 
affirmative duty to elicit all relevant facts, including those 
favorable and unfavorable to the party that is not represented.1" 
Nelson v. Dep't of Employment Security. 801 P.2d 158, 163 (Utah 
App. 1990) (quoting Ellison. Inc. v. Board of Review. 749 P.2d 
1280, 1285 (Utah App. 1988)). In this case, neither party was 
represented by an attorney. However, the case upon which the 
court relied in both Nelson and Ellision. Inc. did not limit this 
duty to those cases in which only one party was represented by 
counsel. See Vidal v. Harris. 637 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Indeed, the United States District Court for the District of Utah 
in a Social Security disability case, cited favorably Vidal v. 
Harris and concluded that an ALJ's failure to elicit all relevant 
facts may result in the record not being fully and fairly 
developed. Stevenson v. Heckler. 588 F.Supp. 980, 983 (Dist. Ut. 
1984). Moreover, in light of R562-6c-10.2.a's requirement that 
"[a]11 issues relevant to the* appeal will be considered and passed 
upon," the ALJ's duty to elicit all relevant facts should be 
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extended to all cases in which a party is not represented by 
counsel. The ALJ's failure, therefore, to elicit further facts 
from Mr. Miller further prejudiced him, the record not being fully 
and fairly developed in that regard. 
C. Mr, Miller had good cause to file a late appeal of the 
Audit Determination. 
In Pacheco v. Board of Review. 717 P.2d 712 (Utah 1986), 
the Supreme Court of Utah, operating under the more stringent 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, held that the ALJ's 
findings that good cause did not exist were arbitrary and 
capricious where the petitioner, Connie Pacheco, had immediately 
notified the hearing officer of her intent to appeal and was not 
specifically told that her failure to file by a certain date would 
preclude her from being heard on the merits. Like Pacheco, Mr. 
Miller herein immediately notified the auditor of his intent to 
appeal the Audit Determination. Moreover, because the Board of 
Review's findings regarding an extension of time are not supported 
by substantial evidence, the Board of Review's findings that good 
cause did not exist for Mr. Miller's failure to file a timely 
appeal are neither supported by substantial evidence nor are they 
reasonable. 
Furthermore, the record supports the fact that Mr. 
Miller was misled as to what the field auditor required of him. 
19 
Although the auditor testified that sometime after November 11, 
1991 he notified Mr. Miller on two occasions "that he needed to 
file a written appeal immedicitely and that timeliness had become 
an issue in terms of filing the appeal," the auditor could not 
identify the dates on which this occurred. Hearing Transcript, 
p. 8; Record on Review, p. 33. The Board's finding that good 
cause did not exist for filing a late appeal is not, therefore, 
supported by substantial evidence nor is it reasonable when 
considered in light of the facts that (1) the Board's findings 
regarding the alleged 10-day extension time are not supported by 
substantial evidence, (2) the Board failed to identify the dates 
on which Mr. Miller spoke with the auditor subsequent to November 
11, 1991, and (3) pursuant to Mr. Miller's testimony, he mailed 
the written appeal as soon as he was notified by the auditor that 
he needed to do so. Hearing Transcript, p. 5; Record on Review, 
p. 30. 
Moreover, unlike the case in Arevalo v. Department of 
Employment Security, 745 P.2d 847, 848 (Utah App. 1987), wherein 
the petitioner was unable to explain why he filed an appeal almost 
three weeks late, Mr. Miller, in addition to his communications 
with the field auditor, notified the auditor that he needed 
additional time in order to gather the necessary information to 
support his appeal. Record on Appeal, p. 42. Indeed, as 
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evidenced by the Schedules of Unreported Wages admitted into 
evidence at the May 13, 1992 hearing, Mr. Miller was required to 
examine business records over a period of three years covering 
more than one hundred (100) different individuals. While the 
Department conducted the audit of Mr. Miller's business over a 
period of months, Mr. Miller was allegedly expected to provide the 
grounds upon which he appealed the Department's determinations 
within a matter of days. If Mr. Miller was not required to 
provide such detailed information, the record does not reflect 
that he was ever notified of that fact. Certainly, the necessity 
of reviewing and obtaining business records and information 
covering a period of three years and over one hundred individuals, 
together with the conversations with the ALJ regarding the appeal, 
constitute circumstances which are compelling and reasonable under 
R562-6c-8 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
For the foregoing reasons, therefore, the Board of 
Review's decision affirming the decision of the ALJ is not 
supported by substantial evidence and is not reasonable upon a 
review of the record. Moreover, little doubt can be had that Mr. 
Miller has been substantially prejudiced by the decision of the 
Board of Review in this regard. 
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II. THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGE'S DECISION THAT MR. MILLER DID NOT HAVE GOOD CAUSE 
TO REQUEST RESCHEDULING OF THE MARCH 9, 1992 HEARING. 
Pursuant to R562-6C-11.4 of the Utah Administrative 
Code, a party who has failed to participate at a hearing before 
an administrative law judge may, within seven days after the date 
of a scheduled hearing, make a written request for reopening the 
hearing which will be granted if good cause is shown for failing 
to participate. The rule further provides that "[i]f the request 
for reopening is not filed within seven days, reopening will not 
be granted unless the party can show good cause for failing to 
make the request within the seven-day time limitation." 
Moreover, pursuant to R562-6C-11.4(b), good cause does not include 
such things as the following: 
(1) Failure to read and follow instructions on the 
notice of hearing, 
(2) Failure to arremge personal circumstances such 
as transportation or child care, 
(3) Failure to arrcinge for receipt or distribution 
of mail, 
(4) Failure to delegate responsibility for 
participation in the hearing, 
(5) Forgetfulness. 
In the case before* the Court, Mr. Miller testified at 
the May 13, 1992 hearing before the ALJ that he failed to appear 
at the March 9, 1992 hearing because he erroneously circled March 
19, 1992 rather than March 9, 1992 as the hearing date. Hearing 
Transcript, p. 3; Record on Appeal, p. 28. He further testified 
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that in preparing for the hearing approximately three days after 
March 9, 1992, he discovered his error at which time he 
immediately called the ALJ who informed Mr. Miller to write 
another request for another hearing date. Hearing Transcript, pp. 
3-4; Record on Appeal, pp. 28-29. Mr. Miller admits to having 
probably received the hearing notice which included instructions 
regarding the time period within which to make a written request 
to reschedule the hearing and a copy of such notice was admitted 
into evidence as Exhibits A-l and A-2. Hearing Transcript, p. 3; 
Record on Appeal, pp. 19-20, 28. The evidence introduced at the 
May 13, 1992 hearing also included Mr. Miller's request for a new 
hearing date which was postmarked March 27, 1992. Record on 
Appeal, p. 22. 
In response to the ALJ's inquiry as to why he failed to 
mail a request for rescheduling until March 27, 1992, Mr. Miller 
indicated that he believed he had 30 days based on the appeal 
information included with the decision made pursuant to the March 
9, 1992 hearing which was dated and mailed on March 11, 1992. 
Hearing Transcript, p. 4; Record on Appeal, p. 29. The decision 
provided that it would become final "unless, within thirty days 
from the date of this decision, further written appeal is made to 
the Board of Review . . . setting forth the grounds upon which the 
appeal is made." Record on Appeal, p. 21 (emphasis in original). 
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Mr. Miller, therefore, first received the notice of hearing which 
included the hearing instructions, later spoke with the ALJ who 
informed him to file a written request for another hearing, and 
then received the decision of the ALJ pursuant to the March 9th 
hearing he failed to attend, which decision stated he had 30 days 
to appeal. Moreover, the record does not reflect that when Mr. 
Miller called the ALJ a few days after the hearing, that the ALJ 
notified Mr. Miller that he needed to send the written request 
within seven days of the hearing. Not unlike the case in Pacheco 
v. Board of Review, good cause for the delay existed where the ALJ 
failed to give Mr. Miller express warning that a delay would 
foreclose his opportunity for another hearing. 717 P.2d 712, 714-
15 (Utah 1986). 
Furthermore, the notice mailed to Mr. Miller indicating 
the date of the March 9, 1992 hearing does not indicate the date 
on which it was mailed to Mr. Miller, providing only that it was 
"Dated and Mailed by: ncg." Record on Appeal, p. 19. Moreover, 
neither the Board of Review nor the ALJ made any findings in that 
regard which raises serious concerns regarding compliance with the 
rules promulgated by the Commission as well as due process. While 
it cannot be disputed that Mr. Miller did in fact receive the 
notice, when he received it was not determined by the Board of 
Review. Pursuant to R562-6c-10.l.a of the Utah Administrative 
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Code, "[a]11 interested parties will be notified by mail at least 
seven days prior to the hearing ....•• There is no evidence 
in the record whatsoever as to when notice was mailed to Mr, 
Miller, to The foregoing facts, therefore, clearly 
constitute much more than a mere failure to read and follow 
instructions or forgetfulness. The Board of Review's decision 
affirming the ALJ's findings that good cause does not exist for 
Mr, Miller's failure to appear at the March 9, 1992 hearing, is 
not, therefore, supported by substantial evidence and is clearly 
unreasonable in light of (1) lack of any substantiating evidence 
indicating when the notice of hearing was mailed to Mr. Miller, 
(2) the ALJ's failure to warn Mr. Miller regarding his time 
constraints, and (3) Mr. Miller's subsequent receipt of the March 
11, 1992 decision notifying him that he had 3 0 days within which 
to appeal the March 9, 1992 decision. 
Mr. Miller has indeed been substantially prejudiced by 
the Board's decision affirming the decision of the ALJ, which, as 
set forth above, is not supported by substantial evidence and is 
clearly unreasonable upon a review of the whole record, if not 
arbitrary and capricious. 
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CONCLUSION 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the 
Board of Review's decision in Case No. 92-BR-237-T affirming the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision in Case No. 92-A-2565-T which 
held that Mr. Miller does not have good cause to request 
rescheduling of a hearing, and in the alternative, that Mr. Miller 
failed to file a timely appeal and did not have good cause for 
late filing, be reversed and that this case be remanded to the 
Industrial Commission for an appeal on the merits of the case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //^day of February, 1993. 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
J^f^e^vS^. Gray^T^ 
sys for i^ ppe Attorne A llant-Mr. Miller 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Jeffrey S. Gray, hereby certify that on the 11th day 
of February, 1993 I served two (2) copies of the attached Brief 
of Petitioner, mailing the same by first class mail with 
sufficient postage prepaid to Lorin R. Blauer, Attorney for 
Respondent, at the following address: 
Lorin R. Blauer 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
140 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 11600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
/ttorrreys for Appellant-Petitioner 
ADDENDUM A 
DECISION OF BOARD OF REVIEW 
THE INDUSTRIAL OCMflSSXGN OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SBCORTIY 
APPEALS TRIBUNAL 
DECISION OF AIimnSIRKEIVE IAW JUDGE 
Norm Miller Used Cars 
ATIN: Norman Miller 
PO Box 392 
Lehi, UT 84043 
Enop. No- 8-129629-0 
Case No. 92-A-2565-T 
DATE OF DETERMINATION: March 11, 1992 DATE OF HEARING: March 13, 1992 
DATE OF APPEAL: March 27, 1992 PLACE OF HEARING: Provo, UT 
APPEARANCES: Appellant and Department Representative 
ISSUE: Whether the appellant had good cause for failing to attend the original 
hearing and whether the employer's appeal was filed in a timely manner 
or had good cause to file a late appeal. 
Timeliness of the appeal is an issue to be determined in accordance with Section 
35-4-10 (b) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Rules pertaining thereto. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The Appeals Tribunal sent notice to the appellant of a hearing to be held on 
March 9, 1992 at the Provo Job Service office. A statement of hearing 
instructions acxxxnpanied the notice. The instructions informed the appellant if 
he failed to attend, a decision on the matter would be issued on the information 
available to the Administrative Law Judge. The instructions further explained if 
the appellant failed to appear he must request in writing within seven days for 
the hearing to be rescheduled. 
When the appellant received the hearing notice, he erroneously recorded the 
hearing date upon his calendar. The appellant did not appear at the hearing. 
Since the appellant failed to appear, the Tribunal issued a decision based upon 
the information available. The Tribunal issued the decision on March 11, 1992. 
A few days after the hearing, the appellant called the Administrative Law Judge 
to request the hearing to be rescheduled. The Administrative Law Judge explained 
the request must be in writing with an explanation as to why he did not appear as 
scheduled. The claimant sent written response on March 27, 1992. 
On October 23, 1991, the Department issued a Notice of Audit Determination 
assessing the appellant contributions, interest and penalties. The decision 
informed the appellant that the decision becomes final within ten days unless a 
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written appeal is filed in writing. The auditor who performed the audit had 
expressed verbally to the appellants accountant on several occasions the results 
of his audit and the procedure for appeal before he issued his decision in 
writing. 
On November 1 the auditor received a telephone call from the appellant who 
indicated he just received the decision from his accountant. The auditor 
explained the need for the written appeal. The auditor gave the appellant an 
extension of ten days in which Mr. Miller could file an appeal. The Department 
did not receive any response or communication from the appellant during the 
extension period. Subsequently, Mr. Miller called the auditor. The auditor 
again reiterated the procedure for filing an appeal. No response was made by the 
appellant. The Department processed the audit determination during the beginning 
of December to initiate collection. The appellant finally sent a letter of 
appeal on December 11, 1991 setting forth the reasons for the appeal. The 
Department reviewed the appeal with its acxxxnpanying information. The Department 
found no reason to alter the audit decision and referred the matter to the 
Appeals Tribunal. 
REASONING M D COtKHJSICH OF MW: 
Section 35-4-10(b) of the Utah Employment Security Act states: 
Appeal of QunUlbuticxg Decisions, 
(b) Within ten days after the mailing or personal 
delivery of a notice of a determination or decision rendered 
following a review und€>r Subsection (a), an employing unit 
may appeal to an administrative law judge by filing a notice 
of appeal. The administrative law judge shall give notice 
of the pendency of the appeal to the cxxnmission which is then 
a party to the proceedings. After* affording the parties 
reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing, he shall make 
findings and conclusions and on that basis affirm, modify or 
reverse the determination. The parties shall be promptly 
notified of the administrative law judge's decision and 
furnished a copy of the decision and findings. The decision 
is the final decision of the cxxnmission unless within ten 
days after the date of mailing of notice to the parties1 last 
kncwn addresses or in the absence of a mailing within ten 
days after the delivery of notice, further appeal is 
initiated under the provisions of this section. 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to this section provide in pertinent 
part: 
A. GENERAL DEFINITION 
This section of the Act provides the opportunity to 
appeal a contribution decision. Examples of decisions which 
may be appealed include: Whether an employing unit is an 
employer, whether services performed are employment and 
determinations involving contribution liability. The 
provisions of the Rule for Section 35-4-6 (c) which relate to 
appeals of benefit decisions are hereby incorporated by 
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reference and, therefore, apply to appeals of contribution 
decisions* 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 35-4-6 (c) provide in 
pertinent part: 
R562-6c-8. Good Cause for Not Filing Within Time Limitations, 
A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is 
determined that the appeal was delayed for good cause. Good 
cause is limited to circumstances where it is shewn that: 
1. The appeal was filed within 10 days of actual 
receipt of the decision if such receipt was beyond the 
original appeal period and not the result of willful neglect; 
or 
2. The delay in filing the appeal was due to circum-
stances beyond the control of the appellant; or 
3. The appellant delayed filing the appeal for circum-
stances which were ccqpelling and reasonable. 
R562-6C-11. Rescheduling and Adjournment of Hearings, 
4. After the Hearing 
Any party who fails to participate personally or by 
authorized representative at a hearing before an Adminis-
trative Law Judge may, within seven days after the scheduled 
date of the hearing, make a written request for reopening of 
the hearing. Such petition will be granted if good cause is 
shewn for failing to participate. A request for reopening 
made after the scheduled hearing must be in writing; it must 
state the reason(s) believed to constitute good cause for 
failing to participate at the hearing; and it must be 
delivered or mailed within a seven-day period to the Appeals 
office or to an office of the Department of Employment 
Security or to a Job Service office in any state. If the 
request for reopening is not filed within seven days, 
reopening will not be granted unless the party can shew good 
cause for failing to make the request within the seven day 
time limitation. . . If a request for reopening is made, a 
hearing will be scheduled and notice will be given or mailed 
to each party to the appeal, to determine if there is good 
cause for reopening the hearing. 
a. Failure to report as instructed at the time and 
place of the scheduled hearing is the equivalent of failing 
to participate even if the party reports at another time or 
place. In such circumstances, the party must make a written 
request for rescheduling and shew good cause in accordance 
with these Rules before the matter will be rescheduled. 
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b. Good cause for failing to participate in an appeal 
hearing may not include such things as: 
(1) Failure to read and follow instructions on the 
notice of hearing, 
(2) Failure to arrange personal circumstances such as 
transportation or child care, 
(3) Failure to arrange for receipt or distribution of 
mail, 
(4) Failure to delegate responsibility for participa-
tion in the hearing, 
(5) Forgetfulness. 
The appellant in this case failed to properly follcw the notice of hearing and 
accxxnpanying instructions. The appellant's failure to record the date properly 
upon his calendar does not constitute good cause to request rescheduling. Thus, 
rescheduling is denied. 
Nevertheless, if the appellant possessed good cause to request rescheduling, the 
Tribunal would hold lack of jurisdiction because the appellant filed an untimely 
appeal without good cause. When the Department issued the audit determination, 
the appellant received an extension of ten days in which to file an appeal. The 
auditor, in addition to written information given to the appellant, explained 
verbally to the appellant the need to file a written appeal. The evidence shews 
the appellant took no action to establish an appeal until after the Department 
processed the audit for collection. 
The appellant has not provided any evidence which would demonstrate he was 
unable to file a written appeal or was prevented from doing so during the 
extended appeal period. The evidence does not shew the delay in filing the 
appeal was due to circumstances beyond the appellant's control or compelling. 
The appellant failed to file an appeal in accordance with Section 35-4-10 (b) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act. Therefore, the Department's decision is 
considered final. 
DECISION: 
The appellant does not have good cause to request rescheduling. In the 
alternative, the Tribunal holds the appellant failed to file a timely appeal and 
did not have good cause for late filing. Thus, pursuant to Section 35-4-10 (b) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the 
matter, and the Department's decision remains undisturbed. 
Kenneth K,. 
Administrative Tm? Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
This decision will become final unless, within tiurty\days from May 22 
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (VO Box 11600, Sal 
City, UT 84147) setting forth the grounds upon which the/appeal is made. 
KM/jsn 
cc: Norm Miller Used Cars 
Employment Security Act Section 35-4-22(j)(5)(A through T) 
(r0 Services performed by an individual for wages or under any contract of 
hire, written or oral, express or imp>lied, are deemed to be employment subject 
to this act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission 
that the individual is an independent, contractor. The commission shall analyze 
all of the facts in Subsections (A) through (T) under the common-law rules 
applicabJc to the employer-employee relationship to determine if an individual 
is an independent contractor. An individual is an independent contractor if 
the weight of the evidence supports that finding. The following factors are to 
be considered if applicable: 
(A) whether the individual works his or her own schedule, or is 
required to comply with another person's instructions about when, 
where, and how work is to be performed; 
(B) whether the individual uses his or her own methods and requires 
no specific training from the purchaser, or is trained by an 
experienced employee working with nim or her, is required to take 
correspondence or other courses, attend meetings, and by other methods 
indicates that the employer wants the services performed; 
(C) whether the individual's services are independent of the success 
or continuation of a business, or are merged into the business where 
success and continuation of the business depends upon those services 
and the employer coordinates work with the work of others; 
(D) whether the individual's services may be assigned to others, or 
must be rendered personally; 
(E) whether the individual has the right to hire, supervise, and pay 
other assistants pursuant to a contract under which the individual is 
responsible only for the attainment of a result, or the individual 
hires, supervises, and pays workers at the direction of the employer; 
(F) whether the individual was hired to do one job and has no 
continuous business relationship with the person for whom the services 
are performed, or continues to work for the same person year after 
year; 
(G) whether the individual establishes his or her own time schedule, 
or does the employer set the time schedule; 
(H) whether the individual is free to work when and for whom he or 
she chooses, or is required to devote full-time to the business of the 
employer, and is restricted from doing other gainful work; 
(I) whether the individual uses his or her own office, desk, 
telephone or other equipment, or is physically within the employer's 
direction and supervision; 
(J) whether the individual is free to perform sf dees at his or her 
own pace, or performs services in the order or sequence set by the 
employer; 
(K) whether the individual submits no reports, or is required to 
submit regular oral or written reports to the employer; 
(I.) whether the individual is paid by the job or on a straight 
commission, or is paid by the employer in regular amounts at stated 
intervals; 
(M) whether the individual accounts for his or her own expenses, or 
is p<»id by I he employer for expenses; 
(N) whether the individual furnishes his or her own tools, or is 
furnished tools and materials by the employer; 
(0) whether the individual has a real, essential, and adequate 
investment in the business, or has a lack of investment and depends on 
the employer for such facilities; 
(P) whether the individual may realize a profit or suffer a loss as 
a result of services performed, or cannot realize a profit or loss by 
making good or poor decisions; 
(Q) whether the individual works for a number of persons or firms at 
the same time, or usually works for only one employer; 
(R) whether the individual has his or her own office and 
assistants, holds a business license, is listed in business 
directories, maintains a business telephone, or advertises in 
newspapers, or does not make services available except through a 
business in which he or she Las no interest; 
(3) whether the individual may not be fired or discharged as long as 
he or she produces a result which meets contract specifications, or 
may be discharged at any time; and 
(T) whether the individual agrees to complete a specific service, 
and is responsible for its satisfaction or is legally obligated to 
perform the service, or may terminate his or her relationship with the 
employer at any time. 
For additional information concerning employment status under common law, pi 
refer to: 
1. internal Revenue Service Circular E, Employer Tax Guide; 
2. Internal Revenue Service Small Business Tax Workshop publication, 
Common Law Factors Defined" and "Comparative Approach of 20 Common 
Factors"; 
3. Job Service Field Audit Department, 533-2243. 
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BOARD OF REVIEW SMH/¥M/lFB/cd 
The Industrial canmissian of Utah 
Unegoployinent Oaipensation Appeals 
NORM MILLER USED CARS 
Employer No. 8-129629-0 
: Case No. 92-A-2565-T 
: DECISION 
: Case No. 92-HR-237-T 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
The appellant, Norm Miller Used Cars, appeals the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge which held that the appellant had failed to appeal 
an earlier Department decision within the time permitted by Section 35-4-6 (c) 
of the Utah Employment Security Act. The ALJ, "therefore, concluded that he 
lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellant!s appeal further. The 
Department decision which held that remuneration for services performed by 
individuals in behalf of the appellant was subject to liability for 
unemployment insurance contributions, pursuant to Sections 35-4-22(j)(1), 
35-4-22(p) and 35-4-22(j) (5) of the Act, is still in effect. 
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the 
Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to be a 
correct application of the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act, 
supported by cconpetent evidence and, therefore, affirms the decision. In so 
holding, the Board of Review adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
In this case, the appellant appeals the ALT's denial of 
rescheduling for a hearing on the appellant's late appeal. The appellant 
argues that he should be granted rescheduling of the hearing because he 
recorded the hearing date wrong and thus missed the hearing. The Board of 
Review notes, however, that the appellant did not immediately request 
rescheduling upon discovering his error as instructed in the instructions 
that accompany the Notice of Hearing which state that the hearing should be 
requested within seven days. Rather, the appellant waited over two weeks 
after discovering the error before requesting rescheduling. The purpose for 
the hearing, which the employer missed, was to determine whether the 
appellant had good cause for filing his initial appeal over one month late. 
Thus, the appellant has established a pattern of late filing of appeals, of 
inattention to details regarding the date of appeal hearings, and late 
requests for requesting rescheduling of hearings. The Board of Review agrees 
with the ALJ that the ertployer has. failed to establish good cause for failing 
to make a timely request for rescheduling of the hearing. 
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In its appeal, the appellant also complains about abuses of the 
unemployment insurance system. The Board of Review is aware that there are 
those who do abuse the unemployment insurance system. The Departirvant has a 
Benefit Payment Control unit whose function is to investigate and prosecute 
abuses of the system. The Department needs cooperation, support and 
assistance of the citizens to avoid abuses and to cut off further abuse by 
those who are abusing the system. The appellant is invited to contact the 
Benefit Payment Control unit of the Department and report any evidence which 
he has of persons who are abusing the uneirployment insurance system. When 
abuses are properly dealt with and controlled, all employers of the State 
benefit by a reduction in the costs of the unemployment insurance system. 
The appellant may reach the Benefit Payment Control until by calling 536-7616 
or 536-7613. 
This decision becomes final on the date it is mailed, and any 
further appeal must be made within 30 days from the date of mailing. Your 
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To file an 
appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a 
Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to 
Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Rule 14 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and 
a legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
.BOARD OF REVIEW, 
Dated this 27th day of August, 1992. 
Date Mailed: September 1, 1992. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MATT TNG 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct cqpy 
of the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following 
on this l s t day of September, 1992, by mailing the same, 
postage prepaid, United States mail to: 
Norman Miller 
Norm Miller Used Cars 
P. 0. Box 392 
Lehi, UT 84043 
frvfyz^z^z^ p£fao<K-JL>&s 
ADDENDUM B 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann, S35-4-10(a).lb).(d),(e),(h), and (i) 
(a) A review of a decision or determination involving 
contribution liability or applications for refund shall be 
made by the commission or its authorized representative in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. The decision 
of the representative conducting the review is considered the 
decision of the commission. The commission or its authorized 
representative conducting the review may refer the matter to 
an appeal referee, may decide the application for review on 
the basis of any facts and information as may be obtained or 
may, in its discretion, hear argument or hold a hearing to 
secure further facts. After the review, notice of the 
decision shall be given to the employing unit. The decision 
made pursuant to the review is the final decision of the 
commission unless, within ten days after the date of 
notification or mailing of the decision, a further appeal is 
initiated under the provisions of this section. 
(b) Within ten days after the mailing or personal 
delivery of a notice of a determination or decision rendered 
following a review under Subsection (a) , an employing unit 
may appeal to an appeal referee by filing a notice of appeal. 
The appeal referee shall give notice of the pendency of the 
appeal to the commission, which is then a party to the 
proceedings. After affording the parties reasonable 
opportunity for a fair hearing, he shall make findings and 
conclusions and on that basis affirm, modify, or reverse the 
determination. The parties shall be promptly notified of the 
referee's decision and furnished a copy of the decision and 
findings. The decision is the final decision of the 
commission unless within ten days after the date of mailing 
of notice to the parties' last known addresses or in the 
absence of a mailing within ten days after the delivery of 
notice, further appeal is initiated under the provisions of 
this section. 
* * * 
(d) (1) * * * 
(2) The board of review within the time specified 
for the filing of appeals may allow an appeal from a decision 
of an appeals referee on application filed within the 
designated time by any party entitled to notice of the 
decision. An appeal filed by the party shall be allowed as 
of right if the decision did not affirm a prior decision. 
Upon appeal the board of review may on the basis of the 
evidence previously submitted in the case, or upon the basis 
of any additional evidence it requires, affirm, modify, or 
reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of the appeal 
referee. The board of review shall promptly notify the 
parties to any proceedings before it of its decision, 
including its findings and conclusions, and the decision is 
final unless within ten days after mailing of notice to the 
parties1 last known addresses or in the absence of mailing 
within ten days after the delivery of the notification further 
appeal is initiated under the provisions of this section. 
However, upon denial by the board of review of an application 
for appeal from the decision of an appeal referee the decision 
of the appeal referee is considered to be a decision of the 
board of review within the meaning of this paragraph for 
purposes of judicial review and is subject to judicial review 
within the time and in the manner provided. 
(e) The manner in which disputed matters are presented, 
the reports required from the claimant and employing units 
and the conduct of hearings and appeals shall be in accordance 
with rules prescribed by the commission for determining the 
rights of the parties, whether or not the rules conform to 
common-law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical 
rules of procedure. Whem the same or substantially similar 
evidence is relevant and material to the matters in issue in 
more than one proceeding, the same time and place for 
considering each matter may be fixed, hearings jointly 
conducted, a single record of the proceedings made, and 
evidence introduced with respect to one proceeding considered 
as introduced in the others, if in the judgment of the appeal 
referee having jurisdiction of the proceedings, the 
consolidation would not be prejudicial to any party. A full 
and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings in 
connection with a disputed matter. All testimony at any 
hearing upon a disputed matter shall be reported but need not 
be transcribed unless the disputed matter is appealed. 
* * * 
(h) Any decision in the absence of an appeal as provided 
becomes final ten days after the date of notification or 
mailing and judicial review may be permitted only after any 
party claiming to be aggrieved has exhausted his remedies 
before the commission and board of review as provided by this 
chapter. The commission is a party to any judicial action 
involving any decisions and shall be represented in the 
judicial action by any qualified attorney employed by the 
commission and designated by it for that purpose or at the 
commission's request by the attorney general. 
(i) Within ten days after the* decision of the board of 
review has become final, any aggrieved party may secure 
judicial review by commencing an action in the Court of 
Appeals against the board of review for the review of its 
decision, in which action any other party to the proceeding 
before the board of review shall be made a defendant. In that 
action a petition, which shall state the grounds upon which 
a review is sought, shall be served upon a member of the board 
of review or upon that person the board of review designates. 
This service is considered completed service on all parties 
but there shall be left with the party served as many copies 
of the petition as there are defendants and the board of 
review shall mail one copy to each defendant. . . 
Utah Code Ann, S63-46b-16(4) 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
* * * 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law; 
* * * 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
* * * 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
UAC R562-6C-7 
When it appears that an appeal may not have been 
filed within the time allowed by the Act or these Rules, 
the appellant will be notified and given an opportunity 
to show that the appeal was timely or was delayed for 
good cause. If it is found that the appeal was not filed 
within the applicable time limit and the delay was 
without good cause, the Administrative Law Judge will 
not have jurisdiction to consider the merits unless 
jurisdiction is established in accordance with provisions 
of Section 35-4-6 (b) of the Act. Any decision with 
regard to jurisdictional issues will be issued in writing 
and mailed to all interested parties with a clear 
statement of the right of further appeal or judicial 
review. 
UAC R562-6C-8 
A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is 
determined that the appeal was delayed for good cause. Good 
cause is limited to circumstances where it is show that: 
1. The appeal was filed within 10 days of actual receipt 
of the decision if such receipt was beyond the original appeal 
period and not the result of willful neglect; or 
2. The delay in filing the appeal was due to 
circumstances beyond the control of the appellant; or 
3. The appellant delayed filing the appeal for 
circumstances which were* compelling and reasonable. 
UAC R562-6C-I0.1.a 
1. Notice. 
a. All interested parties will be notified by mail at 
least seven days prior to the hearing . . . . 
UAC R562-6C-I0.2.a 
2. Hearing of Appeal. 
a. All hearings are to be conducted informally and in 
such manner as to protect the rights of the parties. All 
issues relevant to the appeal will be considered and passed 
upon. . . . 
UAC R562-6C-11.4 
4. After the Hearing. 
Any party who fails to participate personally or by 
authorized representative at a hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge may, within seven days after the 
scheduled date of the hearing, mcike a written request for 
reopening of the hearing. Such petition will be granted if 
good cause is shown for failing to participate. A request for 
reopening made after the scheduled hearing must in writing; 
it must state the reason(s) believ€»d to constitute good cause 
for failing to participate at the hearing; and it must be 
delivered or mailed within a seven-day period to the Appeals 
office or to an office of the Department of Employment 
Security or a Job Service office in any state. If the request 
for reopening is not filed within seven days, reopening will 
not be granted unless the party can show good cause for 
failing to make the request within the seven-day time 
limitation. If a request for reopening is not allowed, a copy 
of the decision will be given or mailed to each party, with 
a clear statement of the right of appeal or judicial review. 
If a request for reopening is made, a hearing will be 
scheduled and notice will be given or mailed to each party to 
the appeal, to determine if there is good cause for reopening 
the hearing. 
* * * 
b. Good cause for failing to participate in an appeal 
hearing may not include such things as: 
(1) Failure to read and follow instructions on the notice 
of hearing, 
(2) Failure to arrange personal circumstances such 
as transportation or child care, 
(3) Failure to arrange for receipt or distribution 
of mail, 
(4) Failure to delegate responsibility for 
participation in the hearing, 
(5) Forgetfulness. 
UAC R562-10b-l 
This section of the Act provides the opportunity to appeal a 
contribution decision. . . . The Department will also require 
compliance with rule R562-6C which relates to appeals of 
benefit decisions and therefore applies to appeals of 
contribution decisions. 
